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1.Introduction: 
 
Mining has been a major economic activity in Canada for the last century. It has made a valuable 
contribution to the development of the Canadian economy and to the standard of living of 
Canadians. The benefits include jobs and incomes, tax revenues and the social programs they 
finance, foreign exchange earnings and all that they purchase for Canadians, frontier 
development, support for the national infrastructure, and economic diversification into a broad 
range of economic activities centred on mining. At the same time, mining continues to be 
controversial because it has generated costs of an environmental, social and financial nature,  
especially at the level of local communities. The benefits, which could accrue to the local 
communities, have the potential to be more substantial than they have sometimes been in the 
past. Indeed, the principal objective of the new generation of mine enterprise/community 
relationships, which have been in process of negotiation in the last decade, is to improve the net 
benefits of mining activity for the benefit of the local communities that  were often overlooked in 
the past. 
 The objective of this paper is to analyze some Canadian experiences with respect to the 
economic, social and environmental implications of mineral sector activity on local communities 
close to the mine sites. From this analysis, some perspectives, insights, and ideas are distilled, 
which may be useful for those countries of the Latin American region currently experiencing 
rapid growth of mining , notably Bolivia, Chile and Peru. 
 There are various types of mining communities and their associated mines. Therefore it is 
difficult to generalize about the impacts of mining on the community and about how the net 
benefits could be improved and the negative impacts reduced or eliminated.  The range of 
mining communities includes: 
  - Long-established but isolated mining towns which rely solely on the single enterprise;  
  - A variant of the above: long established company towns developed by the mining 
enterprises themselves; 
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  - Long established communities with diversified economic bases,  which then become 
homes to new mines; 
  - “Fly- in / fly-out” mining, or mines without adjacent communities;.  
  - Temporary tented encampments in areas of intense mineral exploration and possible 
mine development; 
  - Major long-established mining cities in which it has been possible to develop a broad 
range of mineral related economic activities over time; 
 
 This study begins with a general discussion of mining and its interactions with 
communities in the Canadian setting. Then the economic and social effects are examined in the 
Canadian context. The particular issues arising from the expanding mining activities in 
Indigenous regions of the country are then examined briefly. A number of case studies of mining 
and the community in Canada are analyzed. The first is the Voisey’s Bay nickel project and the 
attempt there to negotiate an equitable economic, social, and environmental agreement among 
two Indigenous groups, the Provincial Government, the Federal Government, and the 
International Nickel Company of Canada (INCO). The second case is the Diavik diamond mine , 
in the Northwest Territories. This is important as another attempt to negotiate a fair agreement, 
prior to start-up, between indigenous groups, Governments, and the enterprise. A mature mine in 
an established region of the country, namely potash in Sussex New Brunswick, is then examined 
as an example of a highly successful mine/community relationship. The case of Sudbury, a 
potential “mining metropolis,” is then examined. Finally, some insights emerging from the 
Canadian case studies are summarized. 
 
 
2. Mining, the Community and Public Policy in Canada  
 The most widely-accepted vision for the development of Canada’s mineral sector, agreed 
upon by Mines Ministers of all levels of government, industry, labour, Aboriginal groups and 
environmentalists is that outlined in the Whitehorse Mining Initiative of 1994: 
... a socially, economically, environmentally sustainable and prosperous mining industry, 
underpinned by political and community consensus (Government of Canada, 1996, p.1). 
 
More specifically, the objectives of mineral policy at the federal have been defined as follows: 
1. “To integrate the concept of sustainable development in federal decision-making 
affecting the minerals and metals industry; 
2. To ensure the international competitiveness of Canada’s minerals and metals industry 
in the context of an open and global trade and investment framework; 
3. To advance the cause of sustainable development of minerals and metals at the 
international level through partnerships with other countries, stakeholders and 
multilateral institutions and organizations 
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4.  To establish Canada as a global leader in promoting the safe use of minerals and 
metals elated products; 
 5. Aboriginal involvement in minerals- and metals-related activities;   
6. To provide a framework for the development and application of science and 
technology to enhance the industry’s competitiveness and environmental stewardship” 
(Ibid., p.5.) 
 
 The above objectives emphasize environmental sustainability, community orientation, 
and Aboriginal Peoples as well as technology and economic competitiveness. Although not 
spelled out in detail, the competitiveness dimension presumably would include sub-objectives of 
a more traditional character, such as employment and income-generation into the distant future. 
  However, perhaps surprisingly, this  statement of objectives does not include the 
strengthening of the whole cluster of economic activities which surround mining and generate a 
large proportion of the economic and social benefits to local communities and the nation, and 
which influence the long-term economic sustainability of the whole mineral sector. 
 
 A. Economic Impacts of Mineral Activities on Communities  
 There are many possible impacts of mineral sector activity on the local community. 
These depend on the size of the mine, mine longevity, the development of a number of mines in 
a mining region, the development of other related mineral activities, and the initial size and 
degree of economic diversification in the mining towns. Of special importance is “remoteness” 
or the location of the mine relative to communities.  The most direct and important impact of a 
mine is employment creation and income generation, and the subsequent stimulation of other 
economic activities, serving consumer needs and servicing the mine, which also create 
employment and income. 
 Whether a small community or town is able to capture some of these economic activities 
and diversify its economic base and employment structure depends on a variety of factors. 
Among the determinants of the location of the provision of various types of consumer or 
minerals-related goods and services would be the following: 
(a) The size, duration, and degree of diversity of the local mining activities,  
(b) The pre-existing community, its size and the range of economic activities already undertaken 
there, and 
(c) The remoteness of the mine location and that of the relevant communities. 
 The establishment of a mine and the employment it generates in a community will 
expand the demand for a wide variety of consumer goods and services. Some of these will tend 
to locate near the new and/or expanding consumer market, which accompanies a mine. This 
could include retailing of many sorts, hotels, restaurants and bars, automotive sales and repair, 
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recreational services, every other imaginable personal service, medical services, some financial 
services, and some business services. In terms of manufacturing for the local consumer market, 
this might begin with bake shops, soft drink bottling and some other lines of food processing, 
and then move into more sophisticated products requiring larger local markets.   
  There would probably be relatively few inputs into the mining process which could be 
provided from within a small isolated mining community. More complex equipment, especially 
that requiring major economies of scale in its production, usually cannot be produced in small 
remote towns. However, there are various services, which might be provided at the local 
community level. For example, local enterprises might provide housing, maintenance services, 
roadway construction, construction of sheds and some simple mine buildings, inputs such as 
sand and gravel, and food provision for mine personnel. 
  As a mine community matures and expands, there are other types of inputs, which can be 
provided to the mine (such as vehicle repair, machine shop services, welding, sheet metal work, 
plumbing and electrical services). These may be followed by complex construction projects, and 
perhaps the repair and assembly of basic steel-work (such as vats, bins and hoppers.) Ultimately, 
when a mine community expands greatly, there may be a growing variety of enterprises locating 
there to provide inputs for the mine activities in the region, perhaps for other regions and 
eventually for other countries. In major mine cities, some more complex mine equipment may be  
produced, especially the high bulk- lower value products which are relatively simple to produce, 
of a custom-designed character,  and/or relatively expensive to transport long distances, e.g. 
some underground equipment (such as shaft furniture or roofing bolts,)  some infrastructural 
equipment, steel pipe, wire products, hose products, ventilation ducting, metal structural 
products, drill steel and bits, and perhaps explosives and chemical products. A variety of services 
are likely to be provided in such mining cities: exploration, mining, and processing consulting,  
repair and maintenance services, mine decommissioning services, machinery rental, sales, repair, 
and re-building, cast metal products, legal and financial services especially for mine activities. 
 As the local community expands, there will also be a steady expansion of the provision of 
public goods and social services such as education including ultimately Universities,  health 
facilities including hospitals, infrastructural services (sewage systems, paved roads, parks, 
squares and sidewalks) water systems, electrical systems, recreational facilities, and the local 
government bureaucracy to administer the provision of many of these public activities. If the 
mine community eventually develops into a mining metropolis, the range of these activities may  
expand further. 
 In sum, the development of mining activities may lead to the expansion of a wide variety 
of linked economic activities. In some cases, they may contribute to the development of major 
urban centres. However, small remote mining communities whose fate is tied to a single mine 
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may lose their raison d’être when the ore body is depleted. When the mine shuts down, such 
mining communities may become ghost towns, a phenomenon well known in most major mining 
countries.  
 
 B. Indigenous Peoples and Mineral Development 
 The development of mineral activities increasingly occurs in areas occupied by 
Indigenous peoples, because mineral exploration and mine development are being pushed ever 
further into frontier areas of the north of Canada. In these areas, the Indian and Inuit peoples are 
often a majority of the population, and they continue as the owners of the mineral resources in 
many cases.  
 The introduction of  mining in Indigenous  areas creates important potential benefits but 
also a number of challenges. Some of the benefits  are the same as the general benefits of 
mining, namely employment, income generation, tax payments for local and regional 
governments and everything that can be done with public revenues in terms of social 
expenditures, infrastructure and community development Indigenous communities also have the 
possibility of capturing some spin-off benefits from the expenditures of mining enterprises on 
locally purchased inputs. 
 The First Nations peoples may benefit enormously in future decades by systematically 
developing the relevant mining skills so that they can dominate mining activities in the North. 
Ultimately, this should include partial or complete ownership of some mine enterprises. Their 
proximity to northern mine-sites and the distance commuting system should facilitate this trend. 
  There may also be social problems for Indigenous Peoples. Mining activities and the 
relocation of outsiders into indigenous areas may introduce transient mining personnel who may 
bring with them alcohol, different patterns of consumption, new life-styles. These may disrupt 
community life and traditional ways of living, with adverse impacts on traditional societies 
generally. However, in most but not all parts of Canada, these negative effects occurred well 
before the advent of mining. Second, there may also be impacts on the economic activities of 
indigenous peoples. Hunting, herding or foraging areas risk being disturbed or destroyed.  Rivers 
may be polluted and fishing activities damaged. Third, the environmental impacts of mining may 
affect the health of indigenous peoples directly through air and water pollution and indirectly 
through their impacts on fishing or on economic activities.   
 If there are significant net benefits for indigenous communities, it is likely that they 
would support and participate in environmentally sound mineral development activities in their 
territories or territories adjacent to their communities. However, the key concepts for willing 
support by Indigenous Peoples for mining projects in Canada are (a) net benefits, (b) 
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participation, and (c) respect for the environment. In the words of Dr. Billy Diamond, Grand 
Chief of the Cree: 
The more experienced mining companies realize that, for them most part, Indigenous 
Peoples and the Cree in particular are NOT anti-developmental. We welcome the 
economic benefits, training and technological transfer that are associated with large 
resource projects.  But we do insist on one criteria .....  First and foremost, all aspects of 
the partnership must be co-authored and co-managed by all the partners (August 24, 
1999). 
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 Historically, indigenous communities were regarded as non-participants in negotiations 
with governments and/or private corporate ventures concerning  the terms and conditions under 
which natural resources would be extracted.  Thus, for many years, their claims were ignored 
and they were excluded from such deliberations. With the recognition during the 1960s and 
1970s, that there was legitimacy to the Aboriginal land claims, governments adopted other forms 
of “pseudo-participation”  which were essentially "non-participatory." During the 1990s, 
there has been a change in the position of the First Nations peoples. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has recognized native land claims based on treaties that have not extinguished title to 
land or resources in many areas of Canada.  This means that the process of allocating natural 
resources or laying claim to land titles often must be a tri-partite process in which the indigenous 
communities sit at the negotiating table  and are empowered to make decisions which help shape 
the projects. They therefore exercise "citizen power" which involves various forms of 
"partnership," and some forms of "delegated power," such as the transportation of goods to the 
site.  Finally, they may be allocated "citizen control" over certain stages of the project or areas of 
the resource for the use of their own people, as is indicated the Supreme Court decision in the 
Marshall case of the Mic’mac rights to the eel fishery in Nova Scotia  (September 1999). The 
direction of the Supreme Court on these matters is toward the allocation of greater native voice 
in the allocation of natural resources. 
 Ultimately, the indigenous communities may assume full control over some territories or 
natural resources.  Recently, the Nisga’a band in Northern BC, has been granted a land claim 
which fully recognizes its territorial claim. By virtue of granting their claim, their distinctive 
rights as natives have been extinguished but they gain control over all the lands and natural 
resources in their historic territory.  This claim was approved by Parliament in October 1999, 
and the legislation supporting the claim was approved in December 1999.  Many land claims are 
either currently before the courts or in process. It is likely that many will be recognized as 
legitimate. This will have important consequences for the bands involved and the larger non-
native community. The establishment of Nunuvut as a self-governing territory in the Eastern 
Arctic is also a step in this direction. There are a number of ways in which Indigenous Peoples 
can obtain larger shares of the economic benefits from mine projects. If the Indigenous peoples 
are the owners of the resources, i.e. if their ownership of territory has never been “extinguished,” 
they can claim the royalties which otherwise would have gone to provincial governments. For 
Nunavut, the initial Land Claims Agreement recognized Inuit-owned lands, with the remainder 
in the jurisdiction of Nunavut itself. In time, Nunavut presumably can impose its own corporate 
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income tax as well. If there are not accepted ownership rights, local indigenous communities 
might be able to impose property taxes, if the mine site is within town or regional limits. Another 
possibility is to have funds from a mine invested in a community-owned and controlled   
Endowment or Foundation. 
 Second, Indigenous Peoples can negotiate contractual obligations on the part of the mine 
enterprise to employ them. If they were not already trained for such employment, the enterprise 
could make commitments to establish the necessary training programs. Third, local communities 
could try to obtain the assurance that the mine enterprise would source some purchases of inputs 
for mining activities or for consumption by the mine-workers in the local indigenous economy. If 
there were little relevant business experience, the community could establish an organization to 
promote small businesses with support from the mining enterprise, or the territorial and federal 
governments. 
 There are two mechanisms in operation in Canada now, which try to ensure a fair and 
equitable distribution of the net benefits from mine enterprises. The first of these involves the 
mislabeled “comprehensive environmental reports,” prepared by the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency, of the sort discussed below in the sections on the Diavik and Voisey’s Bay 
projects. In practice, these reports also devote much attention to the social and economic impacts 
of projects as well as to environmental concerns. The procedure for constructing these reports is 
outlined in the Diavik and Voisey’s Bay case studies.  
 The second key mechanism is the so-called “Impact and Benefit Agreement” or “socio-
economic agreements,” which the company must negotiate with the indigenous communities. 
These agreements include many of the same items included in the comprehensive environmental 
agreements regarding economic issues. One important aspect of the agreements is that their 
conclusion may or may not be necessary prior to the start-up of a mine. If such an agreement 
must be reached prior to start-up, the most recalcitrant negotiator can effectively block the 
project even though everyone else has reached agreement. This may produce long delays, unfair 
treatment of different groups or it may even kill a project. On the other hand, if it is not 
necessary to reach an acceptable negotiated agreement prior to start-up, the enterprise may be in 
a strong position to ignore the concerns or demands of some of the partners. 
 
 C.  Long-Distance Commuting, or “Fly-In / Fly-Out Mining” 
 In the last two decades, there have been virtually no new mining communities 
constructed to accompany new mine projects in Canada. Every new project has involved 
transporting or flying the workers into the mine site for shifts of varying periods.  This 
arrangement is referred to as  “long distance commuting,” or “fly-in mining” (Shrimpton and 
Storey, p.190).  
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 Long distance commuting avoids many of the difficulties of single-sector mining towns: 
First, the cost of constructing accommodations of a barracks/hotel nature is low compared to that 
of  a full community. Such accommodation is not considered  “home” so that the range of 
services required is also smaller than a full dedicated mine community. Moreover schools and 
family facilities are unnecessary. Second, the risk of major loss of the investment in the 
community for the enterprise and the public sector should the mine fail prematurely is also 
avoided.  Third, the mining company has greater flexibility in deployment of workers over the 
course of the mineral market cycle. Indeed the workers and their spouses may have greater 
opportunity to find full or part time employment when they are located in a larger town or city 
rather than dwelling permanently in the mining town. Fourth, the human and economic costs of 
community closure, which would accompany a mine shut-down are avoided by long distance 
commuting. Fifth, because this arrangement seems to be reasonably satisfactory to the workers, 
job turnover and perhaps absenteeism are lower for the long distance commuting option as well 
(Ibid., p.195). 
 There are a variety of consequences of this pattern of mining for the development of local 
communities and regions as well as for families. On the positive side, the long distance 
commuting option provides employment for workers from older established mining towns, 
thereby helping maintain such communities. On the negative side, employment opportunities 
may be lost to residents of communities somewhat closer to the mine site. Furthermore, the 
stimuli to small businesses provided by the consumer demand on the part of the mine workers 
may migrate to the towns of origin of the commuting miners. This may be desirable or 
undesirable depending on the circumstances. 
 It is likely that mining will continue to move further and further into the northern areas of 
most Provinces, Labrador, Nunavut and the Western Arctic. Indeed, because of the occurrences 
of diamonds, a growing mining boom in Nunavut and the Western Arctic looks increasingly 
possible. As this occurs, fly-in mining may be of increasing benefit to northern communities and 
to the indigenous peoples of the North. Established indigenous communities could serve as the 
major labour sources for the future mines in these areas. Workers would commute from their 
communities to the dispersed mine sites. A number of factors are in place to make this happen: 
- All of the communities are now equipped with air transport facilities. 
- There is an obvious locational advantage for commuting within the region. 
- There are indigenously owned airlines serving the region. 
- The new types of “Impact and Benefit Agreements” stipulate that large and growing 
proportions of the employment opportunities must go to the First Nations and Inuit 
peoples. 
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3. The Voisey’s Bay Nickel Project: Can Harmony and Equity Be Negotiated Prior to 
Start-Up? 
 
 The Voisey’s Bay nickel project, one of the largest mining projects in Canada in the post-
war period, is of special interest because a variety of major issues have emerged in the 
relationships between the mine enterprise, the Aboriginal Peoples of the area, and various levels 
of government. This project may generate large and much-needed benefits for the Innu and the 
Inuit of the area, for Labrador, and Newfoundland, as well as for the International Nickel 
Company of Canada (INCO.)  To ensure that there is an equitable and viable sharing of benefits, 
a process of negotiation has been undertaken between the Aboriginal Peoples, the enterprise, and 
offices of the federal and provincial governments. An important part of this is the Environmental 
Assessment Report produced by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, designed to 
evaluate the environmental effects of the project proposal, to undertake public hearings for the 
evaluation, and to recommend changes to the proposal. This assessment also includes an analysis 
and evaluation of the economic and social consequences of the project. A more detailed “Impact 
and Benefit Agreement between the company and the Innu and Inuit remains to be negotiated, 
however. On this basis, the Government of Canada in consultation with the other parties gave the 
project a “go-ahead” from an environmental standpoint, on August 3, 1999. 
 
 A. The Context 
 In 1994, two geologists were searching for diamonds for Diamond Fields Resources Inc., 
but ended up discovering the Voisey Bay nickel deposit. In August 1996, the site was acquired 
by the International Nickel Company of Canada for $US 3 billion. A separate enterprise, 
Voisey’s Bay Nickel Company (VBNC,) was spun off for the project. Delineation drilling 
indicated a resource of about 32 million tonnes with grades of 2.83% nickel, 1.68% copper, and 
0.12% cobalt in 1997. It is relatively close to the surface and about 10 kilometres from the ocean.  
Some $US 55 million had been invested in exploration by mid-1999 (INCO, 1999). 
 The VBNC is planning to begin mining the shallow “ovoid” or egg-shaped ore body with 
an open pit mine accessing 32 million tonnes of ore, and later, an underground mine accessing an 
estimated 118 million tonnes. It would employ about 420 persons in the open pit phase and 
perhaps 950 in the underground phase.  The ore would be converted into a concentrate at the 
mine site and shipped to a nearby ocean port for transport to the smelter and refinery, either in 
Sudbury Ontario or possibly in Newfoundland. 
 The main environmental impact of the mine would be the finely ground solid tailings 
remaining after the concentration process, and some waste rock. They were to be  
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“stored under water in two tailings basins made from existing lakes... to prevent .... them 
from being in contact with both air and water simultaneously which would cause them to 
release acid” (Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency Panel, 1999).  
 
 The Voisey’s Bay mine site is in a general area claimed by the Inuit and also the Innu 
Peoples. The Inuit, numbering about 5000 persons, occupy the areas to the north, with a 
community at Nain, about 35 kilometres from Voisey’s Bay. The Innu, numbering about 1500 
are centred at Utshimassits or Davis Inlet, some 80 kilometres south of Voisey’s Bay. They have 
occupied the general region of Northern Labrador and parts of Northern Quebec.  
 The lands were never ceded by the Innu to any other government. In the words of Peter 
Penashue, President of the Innu Nation: 
 
“Innu have never recognized the jurisdictions that now claim us. We have never signed a 
treaty, nor ceded a square inch of our land. In the past these things were not necessary, as 
it was possible for Innu and Akenishau people to share the land and its resources..”   
(Penashue, 1995.) 
 
Land Claims negotiations with the Federal Government have been underway for some time and 
are not close to completion as of early 2000. 
 The Innu and Inuit have limited economic opportunities in the absence of the mine. 
Incomes are low. Unemployment is high. Social and health problems are particularly serious. 
Population growth rates are also high. Economic self-reliance has been increasingly difficult 
given population growth and the limitations of traditional economic activities. At present, there 
is little generation of community financial resources, causing a continuing financial dependence 
on the higher levels of government. In this context, the prospects of new economic activities 
generating jobs, personal incomes, tax revenues, and community self-financing of social 
expenditures are economically, socially, and politically attractive. 
 Mineral development is a Provincial responsibility, so that the Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador is involved as well. Because previous resource agreements 
negotiated by Newfoundland in the past have proven to be unfavourable, the Provincial 
Government has been anxious to defend its interests in the Voisey’s Bay project negotiations as 
effectively as possible. As part of its negotiation process, it passed legislation requiring that all 
minerals extracted in the province also must be smelted and refined in Newfoundland as well. 
On the other hand, INCO argued that the forced location of the smelting and refining in the 
Province was economically unviable. The Provincial Government did not change its position and 
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insisted that the processing occur in the Province or else the project would not proceed. 
Unwilling to make an investment considered unviable, INCO proposed an alternative 
hydrometallurgical process which was cheaper but also unproven for the types of sulphide ores 
of the Voisey’s Bay mine, with the option of dropping the approach if it proved unviable. 
Premier Tobin also refused to budge. The negotiations then broke down and INCO ceased 
further investment in its exploration program.  
 There are a number of risks arising from this impasse. There is no guarantee that the 
hydro-metallurgical process will in fact work. If it does not, all parties will lose immeasurably if 
the company is pressured to try. Another risk is that other nickel projects elsewhere in the world 
come on stream, forcing nickel prices lower, and perhaps delaying Voisey’s Bay for many years 
and conceivably permanently. The loss for the Innu and Inuit would be devastating in the long-
run as they would lose their advantage in the future development of mining in the Canadian 
North.  
 
 B. The Environmental (and Community Benefits) Review  
 An Environmental Review was begun by the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency in January 1997, with INCO, the Provincial and Federal Government and the Aboriginal 
organizations participating and was completed in November 1999. The Environmental 
Assessment Panel Report included a community benefits analysis. 
 The Panel conducted hearings in Labrador and Newfoundland and consulted with the 
Aboriginal organizations and with the Company. It sought and obtained detailed information 
concerning VBNC’s Mining plan, its proposed methods for managing the anticipated 
environmental problems, as well as the social and economic benefits for the local communities. 
It examined issues of air quality, shipping and its impacts on aquatic life, tailings management, 
freshwater fish and habitat, seals whales and polar bears, birds, Caribou and black bears, and 
general contaminants. It explored the impacts of the mine operation on the traditional economy 
of the Innu and Inuit, including the disturbance of wildlife, loss of habitat for animals 
traditionally hunted, contamination of country foods, disruption of travel across, and reduced 
access to traditionally-utilized resources. The Panel also focused on economic concerns such as 
employment, the effects on local business, training, families and communities. A number of 
additional issues were also addressed, namely the size and viability of the relevant ore bodies, 
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the expected mine-life, and the rate of ore extraction, these being the key determinants of the 
sustainability of the benefits which would flow from the mine. Its Report was made public on 
April 1, 1999.  
 The Panel recommended that the project proceed. However this was subject to the terms 
and conditions spelled out in a large number of specific recommendations. The Panel concluded 
that: 
“...  the Project could contribute significantly to sustainable social and economic 
development on the North Coast and in the rest of Labrador, without harming vital 
ecosystem functions and habitats or the ability of Inuit and Innu to keep using the lands 
in traditional ways.”  (CEEA, 1999.) 
 
The rest of the document delineated the conditions that would have to be fulfilled by the 
Company if it was to proceed with the project. 
 While negotiations between the Company and the Innu Nation and the Labrador Inuit 
Association on a formal “Impact and Benefit Agreement” had  not been completed by early 
2000,  
the Panel set out numerous recommendations designed to assure that the economic benefits for 
the Aboriginal communities are significant and sustained. The Panel recognized that when the 
title to the land is held by Aboriginal peoples, Governments must ensure that, if Projects such as 
this take place, the Aboriginal peoples must receive fair compensation, be properly consulted, 
and participate in the resource development. The Panel argued that these could best be assured if 
the Land Claims issue were settled. However, because numerous other factors influence these 
negotiations, it would not be wise to halt the project until such time as a settlement was reached. 
Interim measures were therefore necessary.  
 The compensation and participation dimensions would be incorporated in the Impact and 
Benefits Agreement being negotiated between the Innu Nation, the Labrador Inuit Association 
and VBNC. The Panel recommended that reaching this agreement be a precondition for the 
implementation of the project. 
 In its submission to the Panel, the VBNC prepared an Economic Impact Study (EIS)  
outlining the economic benefits that would flow to the people of the region. These were queried 
by the Panel, further elaborated by the Company and then became the focus of some of the 
Panel’s recommendations. 
 The VBNC agreed to give first preference to members of LIA and the Innu Nation, 
second to citizens of the rest of Labrador, and then to Newfoundlanders. It estimated that 29% of 
the total number of jobs in the open-pit phase of the mine would go to Innu and Inuit, with 21% 
of the total in the technically more complex underground phase of the mining. The VBNC and 
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the Innu Nation also put forward some of the features of the Impact and Benefit Agreement 
which they were in the process of negotiating. These included education and training, quantified 
employment objectives, measures to ensure that the lack of formal education requirements not be 
a barrier to employment, the hiring of an Innu Employment co-ordinator, a workplace respectful 
of traditional Innu values, and an anti-discrimination program. The Inuit had similar concerns 
but had not yet reached a preliminary level of agreement on the design of their Impact and 
Benefit Agreement (IBA) with VBNC. 
 Responding to some of the concerns raised at the Hearings, the Panel recommended that 
additional measures were necessary to overcome some of the barriers to such employment faced 
by the peoples of the region, and to help with the adjustments which such employment would 
require.  Among the recommendations were: 
  - “Improving the existing ‘Multi-Party Training Program’ to increase access to training 
for Aboriginal People and for Women; 
  - Implementing a second chance policy for employees who run into difficulties adjusting 
to their jobs; 
  - Setting up anti-racism and cross-cultural programs; 
  - Designating Cartwright as a pick-up point for employees (to facilitate access to mine 
employment for inhabitants of the south coast of Labrador); 
  - Establishing a process to ensure that women’s concerns and perspectives are built into 
all decision-making in the workplace;  
  - Implementing measures to improve child-care services in the home community.” 
(CEAA, pp.10-11) 
 
 In its Economic Impact Statement, the VBNC estimated the effects of its activities for the 
businesses of the area, for Labrador and the Province. It estimated that Labrador and 
Newfoundland businesses would capture 16% of the expenditures on goods and services. 
Labrador firms would supply nearly 43% of the purchases made within the Province, amounting 
to $US 1.4 billion. It also estimated that indirect employment would generate incomes of $US 1 
billion for the whole of Newfoundland and Labrador, $US 296 million for Labrador alone, and 
$US 50 million for the Northern part of Labrador. According to an “Industrial Benefits 
Monitoring Plan” in operation at this time, $US 37.5 million of a total $US 86 million spent in 
the Province has gone to Labrador. 
 To improve the capability of Labrador and especially Northern Labrador to increase their 
capture of the input purchases of the mine, the Panel recommended that the VBNC, in 
consultation with the Aboriginal and Labrador Businesses, and the Federal and Provincial 
Governments, “... establish a comprehensive supplier development strategy .... to make it easier 
for local suppliers to put in competitive bids” (CEAA, Chapter 15, pp.11-16). This would 
include supplier development initiatives, objectives for Aboriginal and Labrador procurement, 
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and clarified procurement procedures. All of this should be in harmony with the still-to-be 
negotiated IBAs. 
 The mine is to be fly in - fly out operation. This means that while a type of barracks/hotel 
will be constructed adjacent to the mine site, most employees will commute from their respective 
communities. (Nain, 35 kms. to the north, is accessible by aircraft, boat or snow vehicle, 
depending on the season.) This means that benefits should flow to the communities without the 
influx of large numbers of new inhabitants. Nain and Davis Inlet would provide significant 
amounts of labour, and would likely experience increased housing, commercial and community 
construction, and an expansion of business activity. 
 The Panel foresaw major disruption to the town of Nain and called for a variety of 
specific measures to facilitate its adjustment. Perhaps most significant, it recommended that the 
VBNC pay the community to cover some of the additional costs imposed by the mine, for the use 
of community facilities and infrastructure by the VBMC during the construction. This is 
appropriate especially as the mine site is outside of Nain’s current jurisdiction, and would have 
difficulty imposing property taxes on the mine (CEAA, Chap.16, pp.12-16). 
 Compensation payment in the form of a royalty will also be made to the Labrador Inuit 
Association, but the detail of this is included in the IBA and is not yet known. In any case, there 
is no guarantee in any case that the LIA would support Nain appropriately. An independent 
taxation type of payment for Nain is probably unavoidable. Further recommendations were made 
regarding the development of transportation infrastructure, health facilities, and community 
economic development.  Only when the Impact and Benefit Agreement is made public will we 
know of the full agreement reached between the Innu and Inuit and the Company.  
 One hopes that the Indigenous Communities will have been able to obtain a fair share of 
the economic benefits from the VBNC, and that simultaneously, the mine remains commercially 
viable. If the sharing is reasonable and equitable for the Innu, for the Inuit and also for Labrador 
generally, a major break-through in mine-community relations will have been achieved. We 
should have a good idea of this in the next few years. 
 Much of the Panel’s Report was devoted to environmental issues. A large majority of the 
recommendations dealt with the details of the environmental effects of the project. Of critical 
concern was the issue of managing the solid tailings from the mill operation so as to prevent acid 
generation and leakage. Various alternative arrangements were considered, and the Panel 
proposed that the possibility of “back-filling” the open pit cavity with tailings be explored. 
 
 
4. Diamonds in the Northwest Territories: The Diavik Mine 
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 The development of diamond mining in Canada’s Northwest Territories is opening a new 
chapter in Canadian mineral development and perhaps in the relationships between the mining 
enterprises and the Indigenous Peoples. The vast endowment of diamond occurrences only 
became clear with the extensive exploration that took place in the decade of the 1990s. One 
mine, Ekati, is in production, a second, Diavik,  is in the construction phase, while others are in 
the assessment stage. The mines provide a major opportunity for the indigenous communities in 
the areas. It is important that the first agreements between the companies and the communities 
are equitable and fair. 
 
 A.  The Context: Diamond Mining Development in the North 
 In 1991, diamond-bearing kimberlites were discovered in the Lac de Gras region in the 
Northwest Territories, sparking an exploration rush of epic magnitude, especially in the 
Northwest Territories. Approximately $US 510 million was invested in exploration from 1989 to 
1998 (Canadian Intergovernmental Working Group, 1998, p.25).  Numerous kimberlites were 
discovered, including over 100 on the Ekati property, around 50 on the Diavik area, and many 
others at sites in the North. The ore grades are of some are of internationally competitive quality.  
The first mine to come into production was Ekati,  a joint venture between Dia Met of Kelowna, 
B.C. (the Canadian partner--29 percent), Broken Hill Properties of Australia (BHP--51 percent), 
and the two geologists who discovered the ore-body, 
 The second mine site is that of Diavik Diamond Corporation Ltd,  60 percent owned by 
Rio Tinto PLC of Britain and 40 percent by the Canadian partner Aber Diamond Mines of 
Vancouver. The mine is located on an island in Lac de Gras, which is about 200 kms. south of 
the Arctic Circle. It is estimated that some 104 million carrots of the identified diamond resource 
are of minable quality (Canadian Intergovernmental Working Group, 1998, p.29). The mine is to 
include four kimberlite “pipes” on, or adjacent to, the island in Lac de Gras. Diavik proposes to 
construct dykes around three of the pipes, which lie in 12 and 26 metres of water. The areas 
inside the dykes would be drained thereby permitting open-pit mining in the pipes, reaching 
depths of about 300 metres. Subsequently, underground mining would be initiated at two of the 
pipes, reaching depths of 400 metres.  Underground mining would be  more expensive but would 
extend the mine's life by six years. This mine is scheduled to come on stream in 2003. It is 
estimated that $US 884 million will be spent by the partners in the development of the mine site  
(P. Kennedy).  The estimated mine life is 16 to 22 years. However, intense exploration is 
continuing in the region, and it would be surprising if additional economically viable pipes were 
not located and “proved up” thereby extending the life of the mine activity significantly. The 
diamonds will be extracted from the ores  in a conventional diamond recovery plant. 
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 Four groups of First Nations peoples have traditionally used the territories in the region 
of the Diavik mine site: the Yellowknife Dene First Nation (YDFN), the Lulsel K’e Dene First 
Nation (LKDFN), the North Slave Metis Alliance (NSMA), and the Kitikmeot Inuit Association 
(KIA). The Diavik mine lies within the traditional and proposed settlement areas of the Treaty 11 
Dogrib, the Akaitcho Territory Dene, and the NSMA. Land settlement negotiations or pre-
negotiations have been underway for some time. All of these groups are participating in the 
negotiations with Diavik and other relevant organizations. All expect to reach formal Impact and 
Benefit Agreements wth the company as well. 
 The social and economic situation of the Indigenous Peoples is generally viewed as 
inadequate. Unemployment has been high, in the area of 20%. Incomes are relatively low. 
Reliance on welfare is significant. The tax base of the communities is weak. The communities 
continue in a quite dependent relationship with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development. Traditional economic activities continue but do not provide sufficient incomes for 
many people. 
 
 B. The “Comprehensive Study Report” 
 The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act required that Diavik undertake a 
comprehensive study of the impact of the mine on the environment of the area as well as on the 
socio-economic well-being of the people in the region. Diavik’s report  was based on geo-
technical, environmental, socio-economic research, as well as  public consultation and 
discussions, which took place between  1994 and 1998.  The Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency, in turn, received the report, undertook further consultations with the 
Aboriginal Associations, the Territorial Government, and the Federal Agencies responsible for 
the project, (namely the Departments of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Natural 
Resources, and Fisheries and Oceans). It presented its Comprehensive Study Report to the public 
in June 1999. After some time for public debate of the project, the Federal Government 
announced that the project would not have to proceed to a more extensive public panel study. On 
November 4 1999, the Federal Minister of the Environment, David Anderson, announced that 
the project could proceed to development. This would enable the Company to begin construction 
this winter Season as the winter road to the site is open only January to March. But further 
delays in obtaining environmental permits may have postponed the mine opening to 2004 
(Shuster, p.1.) 
 In its Report, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency summarized the position 
taken by Diavik in its submission to the Agency, presented the critiques of the Aboriginal 
Organizations, of the Responsible (Federal) Agencies or “RAs,” and of the Governments of the 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut, and then presented its own recommendations.  No formal 
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Impact and Benefit Agreements between Diavik and the Aboriginal organizations had been 
reached by the beginning of 2000. Many of the expected effects were spelled out by Diavik and 
included in the CEAA Report. These are outlined below: 
  Employment: 
  Construction Phase, 2000 to 2001: 
   Total Work Force:    600-800 per year on average. 
   Employment for Northerners:  about 280 per year on average. 
  Operations Phase, 2002 to about 2020: 
   Total Work Force:   411 jobs per year. 
   Annual Northern Work Force: 66% or 271 at first, rising later to 
100% of employment later. 
   Aboriginal Employment:  40% or 164  
  Wage Payments: 
  Construction Phase, total:     $US 104.7 million 
  Operations Phase, per annum 
   Total:        $US 20.5 million. 
   Northern Employees:      $US 13.6 million.   
  Purchases of Goods and Services from the North: 
 Construction Phase:  2000 to 2001: 
   Total Capital Cost:     $US 884 million 
  Operations Phase:  2002 onwards: 
   Average Total Annual Cost of Inputs:   $US 61.2 million. 
   Average Purchases from the NWT Businesses: $US 19.0 million.  
  Tax Payments  
  Construction Phase, Total:   
   Federal Government:     $US 28.6 million. 
   Territorial  Governments:     $US 10.9 million. 
  Operations Phase: 
  Federal Government:      $US 4.1 million per year. 
  Territorial Governments:    $US 1.2 million per year. 
 The policy of Diavik is to increase employment of Northerners, including First Nations 
peoples, to 100% of the total, with first priority in hiring accorded to aboriginal people from the 
near-by communities, and second priority to people from other Inuit, Dene and Metis 
communities.  Diavik also committed itself to buy as much from the North as possible (CEAA 
Report, p.200.) It also proposed to undertake special training programs for the local labour force, 
to support business development activities, to increase business capacities in the area, to 
communicate procurement needs clearly, to support the local businesses in obtaining of 
commercial credits, and to design and communicate business strategies for affected groups. It 
also proposed a business development tracking system.  
 Diavik also discussed cultural impacts and well-being, the social impacts on 
communities, training programs, and opportunities for women. 
 22
 The NWT Government and Indigenous Associations made a variety of critiques and 
additional proposals.  The Indigenous groups emphasized the following: 
  - The need for a “Value Added” agreement with Diavik to ensure that significant 
economic spin-offs to the area occur; 
  - Special mitigation efforts and measures to deal with maintaining cultural well-being, 
overcoming sociological barriers to employment;  
  - Ensuring fair access to employment opportunities for women, and problems of “fly-in / 
fly-out” rotation systems. 
 
 An important recommendation accepted in the Report was for the establishment of a 
formal “Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement” to be implemented by the mine, the relevant 
Indigenous organizations, and the Territorial Governments. This mechanism, among other 
things, would identification objectives, design mitigation and monitoring programs, specify the 
responsibilities of the various parties for finance, implementation and final decision-making, 
resolve disputes, and involve public participation.  
 One problem with the social and economic issues area is that the mine enterprises 
negotiate the “Impact and Benefit Agreements” individually with each Indigenous organization 
or community. This could  weaken the Indigenous organizations’ bargaining strength. These 
negotiated agreements cover such things as job opportunities, training, and preferential hiring 
programs; financial transfer payments, royalties, and equity participation; new business 
development and contractual arrangements; and compensation for declines in harvests of wildlife 
and fish. Many of these agreements are not in the public domain and therefore cannot be closely 
scrutinized.  The character and fairness of the agreements probably depends upon the capabilities 
of the aboriginal negotiators and the quality of information at their disposal. It has been argued 
that the Companies should be forced to sign impact and benefit agreements with a consolidated 
group of all impacted aboriginal communities, rather than with one community at a time with 
widely varying access to knowledge. This appeared to critics as a  "divide and conquer" strategy 
on the part of the mine enterprises (Keith, 1999). 
 The asymmetry of information between the enterprises and the Indigenous Organizations 
may be a serious obstacle in the construction of fair Agreements between the bargaining parties. 
Indigenous groups and communities have had little opportunity in the past to acquire relevant 
geological, technical, commercial, and organizational information. Moreover, these groups and 
communities usually will be inexperienced at undertaking such negotiations. In contrast, the 
companies have the technical knowledge as well as the bargaining expertise. They will have 
employees to conduct the negotiations and who are experienced in the arts of negotiation and 
who have access to all the relevant information available on the project.  
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 To remedy this asymmetry, it is vital that publicly financed support be made available to 
those Indigenous Organizations and communities beginning negotiations with mine enterprises 
regarding “Impact and Benefit Agreements.” Such assistance could be provided by staff of 
relevant NGOs, such as the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC), by consultants in 
mineral development, negotiation techniques, financial analists etc., or perhaps by specialized 
personnel from Territorial Governments or the Federal Government.  
 The CEAA’s Comprehensive Study Report: Diavik Diamonds Project attempted to 
include a comprehensive range of environmental issues. It included possible impacts on air 
quality, global climate change, vegetation and terrain, wildlife of all varieties in the areas, 
biodiversity, water quality, fish, and the impacts of the environment on the project itself,  and 
finally, the possibility of accidents and malfunctions of various sorts and the impacts these could 
have. 
 The Comprehensive Report concluded that the Diavik Mine would have: 
 
(a) No significant adverse effect on air quality provided that the required mitigation measures 
are applied; 
(b) No significant contribution to national or global air particulate emissions;  
(c) No significant adverse effects on vegetation or biodiversity on a regional scale;  
(d) No significant effects on the Bathurst Caribou herd, grizzly bears, or other carnivores, 
raptors, waterfowl, small game, or on the biodiversity of the area.  
(e)  
 However, in some cases, mitigation measures were prescribed, and a  follow-up program 
was proposed to monitor the possible effects. The Report considered that Diavik had adequately 
addressed the environmental requirements related to hydrology and surface water quality, 
surface water runoff, dike construction and sediment management, as well as the isolation of the 
North Inlet and the effluent discharge.  However, again, monitoring and follow-up mitigation 
programs were required in some cases. It was also concluded that the project would have 
negligible impact upon groundwater quality, but a follow-up monitoring program was also 
proposed with mitigation measures if necessary. 
 Diavik agreed to the various follow-up programs and monitoring of a number of areas 
such as ambient air quality, wildlife numbers, water quality, fish and fish habitat, as well as a 
number of socio-economic measures of health, heritage resources, and traditional fisheries and, 
finally, checks for cumulative effects. 
 The review process has been criticized on a number of grounds. First, the Company had 
four years to prepare its environmental assessment submission. The Department of the 
Environment and other interested Departments had from September 1998 to June 1999, to study 
the submission, undertake consultations, undertake their own analysis and research, and prepare 
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their Comprehensive Report. The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) has argued 
that the time was insufficient to enable all the affected voices to be effectively heard (CARC. 
1999, p. 1).  It should be noted that both CARC and the Dogrib Nation had refused to participate 
in the final phases of the environmental evaluation. (Zoe,  November 2 1999: A17). 
 CARC (1999) also argued that the process is flawed because the various projects in the 
region are considered only case by case, without an analysis of the cumulative and long-term 
effects of infrastructural construction and development on the region as a whole.  With more 
mining projects on the horizon, with a major pipeline project in the works, and with the 
probability that transportation infrastructure and perhaps electrical energy infrastructure will be 
introduced to service the mining and pipeline activities, their aggregated environmental effects 
may well be significant, even though each individual project’s impacts may be small or subject 
to mitigation.    
 The major environmental risks in the project appear to be the “tailings mountains” which 
will be build up over the life of the mine as the open pit is excavated. This could result in the 
leaching of heavy metals such as cadmium into the lake and the Coppermine River system, with 
harmful effects of animals and fish as well as human health. Accidents could also occur with 
serious damages to the environment.  In view of these possibilities, there is discussion regarding 
a requirement for the company to contribute up to $US 120 million over time to manage possible 
environmental problems and to undertake long-term stewardship over the mine site after 
decommissioning. The company apparently has proposed a fund of $46 million (Globe and Mail, 
January 6, 2000). In either case, this is an interesting and important precedent. 
 Perhaps all mines should establish such environmental funds or endowments in order to 
cover the costs of environmental damage and care after the mine has shut down. In economists 
terms, this would “internalize the negative externalities” that at other times were shifted to local 
communities, citizens, taxpayers, and governments. This would avoid the traditional but still 
common pattern of the mine enterprise walking away after the shutdown of the mine, leaving the 
rest of society to manage the environmental problems they created. 
 
 
5. A Mature Mine in an Established Region: Potash Mining in New Brunswick1
 The mining of potash (with a salt co-product) near Sussex, New Brunswick commenced 
in 1983. It is an example of a mature well established mine in an already populated area. It has 
                                                          
1  This section draws on field-work undertaken by Professor Allan Steeves, Sociology, Carleton University in 1987-
1988 and again in 1999. The papers prepared by A.Steeves on the potash enterprise and the community in New 
Brunswick are listed with the references. 
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had a variety of positive economic and social impacts on the immediate communities and the 
adjacent areas, with few significant negative effects. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a mine with 
more positive net impacts for the local communities. 
 
 A. The Context: Potash Mining in New Brunswick 
 In January 1971, occurrences of potash were discovered at a site in Plumweseep, near 
Sussex New Brunswick. Mine construction was completed in 1980, with the first shipment of 
potash in 1984. The mine was subsequently transferred from the Potash Corporation of America 
to Rio Algom of Toronto, and subsequently in 1993 to the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan  
(PCS.) 
 The potash deposits are located at a rather shallow level - 400 to 700 metres depth - and 
take the form of layers, originally horizontal but now up-thrust towards the vertical. The mineral 
extraction is done by continuous mining machines, in “cut-and-fill stopes,” with the ore 
extracted via step-by-step cutting out of successive layers. This is important to note, because the 
tailings are then returned to the mine and serve as the new floors for subsequent extraction in an 
“integrated closed-loop system.” Rock salt is also extracted in a different part of the mine using a 
“room-and-pillar” method. The ore is then treated in the surface refinery and the potash 
converted to pellets of various sizes ready for use as fertilizers. This mine has a capacity of 
780,000 tonnes per year for potash, and about 650,000 for rock salt. 
 There are probable potash reserves of 25 years at current mining rates (R. Gauthier, 
Interview, July 1999) although possible reserves may last much longer. There is a current 
problem with water seepage into the mine. To control the seepage requires continuous and 
expensive action, and raises mine costs.  If the problem were to escalate severely, the costs of 
extraction might become excessive and the mine might shut down well before the exhaustion of 
high-quality reserves. 
 Some 344 persons are employed at the mine, underground, in the refinery, the 
administration and ancillary activities (www.potashcorp.com.)  The employees of the mine 
operation are drawn from adjacent communities. No special “company town,” no new town site 
and no special barracks are necessary, as the employees continue to live in existing communities 
or near-by rural areas. The employees commute to the mine using their own means of 
transportation.  
 By coincidence, the mine is located about 100 metres from the Trans-Canada Highway, 
and is close to a main rail line. These facilitate the transport of people, finished products, inputs 
and equipment. The original infrastructure costs and the continuing operational costs have been 
reduced significantly by the ease with which the mine was able to settle into the established 
communities and the region, as well as  the existence of the national transport grid so close to the 
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mine-site. Moreover, access to convenient rail transport provides low-cost transportation to the 
Port of Saint John and thence competitive access to potash markets in the Atlantic area of the 
Western Hemisphere and Europe. 
 A second potash mine-site, located about 20 kilometres south-west of Sussex at Cassidy 
Lake, was opened for intensive exploration in 1979, and a mine was constructed and in operation 
by 1985, with Denison Mines of Toronto as the owner. The mine faced flooding problems and  
was shut down in 1997. This property was also acquired by PCS in 1998. The refinery at this site 
is currently used to upgrade standard potash ore transported from Saskatchewan. The refinery 
employs about 30 persons. 
 The Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan is a large integrated fertilizer producer initially 
established as a Provincial enterprise by the Saskatchewan Government in 1975. It expanded 
rapidly during the 1980s and became one of the largest potash producers in the world.  In 1993 
PCS was privatized and since this time it has diversified by acquiring large phosphorous and 
nitrogen producers with the acquisition of Texasgulf in early 1995 and Arcadian Corporation in 
1997.  PCS is now the largest integrated enterprise producing the three fertilizer components in 
the world. 
 Historically, the population of the Sussex area relied primarily on farming, logging and 
pulp-wood industry. Since World War II, employment in these has declined due to 
mechanization. Small farm operators have been leaving agriculture in the area during the past 50 
years. As a result of the decline in these industries, the economy of the region was quite stagnant 
outside Sussex and St. John. Thus it was with relief and optimism that the provincial officials 
and the local population welcomed the potash industry and the prospect of jobs for local workers 
at the beginning of the 1980s. Both mines promised, where possible, to hire and train local 
personnel for work at the mines both underground and in the mill phases of the operation. This 
has been rigorously implemented. 
 
 B. Economic, Social and Environmental on the Local Communities2
 The most important direct economic impact of the mine enterprise in the region is the 
employment and the income it generates. As noted, the two mine operations employ some 374 
persons, and generates about  $US 18.5 million per year in income payments at wage rates well 
above the average for the area (author’s estimate). Besides the direct wage and income 
payments, the mine also acquired a substantial proportion of its inputs locally. A large proportion 
                                                          
2  Unfortunately detailed financial information on the potash mine in New Brunswick is not available because the 
accounts of the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan are consolidated for their entire international operations. The 
detailed information for the Sussex mine were not provided by the company.  
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of the direct purchases of the mine in the region for supplies, services and energy   - about 48.6% 
of total costs  -  were spent in the region. All of the electricity is provided by the provincial 
electrical utility. The company estimated that 52.6% of all purchases of supplies and services  
(excluding fuels and electricity) is purchased from New Brunswick.  This would include such 
things as contract labour e.g. tradesmen, truck and auto parts, and  some basic types of 
machinery and equipment. A variety of new industries that supply the mines were established in 
the area, especially in Sussex (Steeves, 1988). A major trucking cooperative, Kingsco Transport, 
has also been a beneficiary. Thus the economic base of Sussex has broadened somewhat with 
light manufacturing and supply and distribution businesses. 
 It was estimated crudely, by PCS, that on average, about 3 to 4% of purchases of supplies 
and services were from outside of Canada.  However, this may not provide an accurate idea of 
domestic Canadian Value Added relative to foreign Value Added, because a large, though 
unknown, proportion of the items purchased domestically would have been purchased from 
abroad or else would contain imported inputs. No taxes were paid directly to the local 
communities, though the employees paid property taxes in their communities. A significant but 
unknown proportion of the profits of the whole PCS enterprise in Canada would also be paid to 
the Federal and Provincial Governments in the form of Corporate Income Tax. Employees also 
paid personal income taxes to the higher levels of government. An undisclosed amount of 
royalties were also paid to the Provincial Government. 
 The entry of mining into the Sussex region had a variety of impacts of a social character. 
The first impact of course is the greater security of livelihood for individuals, their families and 
their communities as a result of the incomes generated from the mines. This social impact is of 
obvious importance and should not be forgotten. 
 Second, the entry of potash mining into the social settings of King’s County has 
generated a number of changes in communal dynamics. The mining enterprises introduced 
relatively high rates of pay, recruitment policies based upon achievement and formal training, a 
work setting of an “industrial” character (including shift work,) and a global rather than a local 
or regional enterprise orientation. This meant that the "mining community" was quite distinct 
from the local community. The mining enterprises wisely recruited qualified local personnel as 
much as possible. 
 Another feature of  potash mining in Kings County was the large size of the operations, 
relative to the  scale of earlier economic activity. Moreover, they were also continuous process 
operations, working 24 hours, seven days a week. The mines therefore required  "shift work" for 
both their mine and mill employees. This had a number of implications for the community. It 
meant that other agendas had to be altered to accommodate the loss of weekends and evenings at 
home. It also had the effect of isolating the miners from community activity, which up to this 
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point had been organized to take place either in the evenings or during the weekend. However, 
the shift-work arrangement also has some attractions. At the PCS mine, the bulk of the 
production personnel work four 12-hour days on and then take four days off with rotations on 
day and night shifts. Workers preferred this shift arrangement because during the "four days off" 
they are able to engage in other activities such as farming, logging, mechanical work, or auto 
body repair enterprises (Steeves, Interviews, 1988.) 
 Third, judging from the views of many of the miners themselves, they had little difficulty 
adapting to mine production even where it involved underground work. The personnel managers  
considered that the local personnel had excellent mechanical and electrical skills, and proved to 
be good mechanical operators. 
 Although one might think that the establishment of the potash mines might have 
contributed to a process of population concentration in small cities and towns in the area, in fact 
this has not occurred. Indeed, there has been a process of  “ruralization” in operation as many 
miners and their families have chosen to locate outside the municipalities in the area thus 
becoming part of the rural non-farm population. In analysing the detailed population data for the 
region, Steeves (1988) found that the rural areas grew at twice the rate of the urban areas over 
the course of the decade 1976-1986, at 2.4% per year in comparison with 1.2% for the urban 
areas. Approximately 80 percent of the mine labour force  lived in the unincorporated areas of 
the County,  in their home communities (Steeves, Interviews, 8 October 1999). 
 The PCS Plumweseep mine has had a surprisingly small environmental impact. Indeed, it 
must be one of the more ecologically benign mine operations in the world. The reason for this is 
that the solid tailings and the liquid brine wastes remaining after the refining process are both put 
back into the mine. As a result, there is neither a tailings mountain beside the mine-site, nor a 
discharge of noxious brines into nearby rivers or tailings ponds. There is an aerial discharge of 
vapours and smoke but it is almost insignificant, judging by appearances. The inhabitants of the 
area seemed to show little concern for the discharge. It seems to have no negative consequences 
in terms of damage to plant life, to farming which continues up to the mine site gates and fences, 
or to tourism in the area. (There is a Bed and Breakfast lodging facility next to the mine.)  There 
were no noticeable smells caused by the smoke or the refining process apparent outside the mine 
site. 
 
 
6. Sudbury: The Emergence of a Mining Metropolis?  
 Over the last 120 years, Sudbury Ontario has evolved  from a frontier railway and mining 
town to a significant “mining metropolis” and an important regional economic centre in Northern 
Ontario. It has developed both a substantial degree of economic diversification around a  
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mineral-extraction base as well as  a broad range of economic activities of a governmental, 
business service, health and educational character. It may now have reached a stage where it is as 
sustainable as a mining community could expect to be, given its dependence upon difficult and 
volatile international mineral markets.  
 What factors have permitted the emergence of a significant cluster of economic activities 
around mining converting Sudbury from a mine town to a large and complex regional centre 
servicing the mining industry. Can Sudbury become a centre for the global mining economy? 
 
 A. Historical Development of the Sudbury Mineral Economy and Region 
 The Sudbury Basin is a unique geological formation measuring about 60 by 27 
kilometres in an oval or elliptical shape. The foundation of the basin is about 10 kilometres deep. 
It is likely that the basin is the result of the impact of an asteroid that collided with the earth and  
caused a deep fracture in the earth’s crust, permitting the magma or molten rock from deep 
inside the planet to rise to the surface. Nickel mineralization was detected by surveyors in 1856, 
but  it was not until the construction of the transcontinental Canadian Pacific Railway in 1883 
that an outcropping of copper was revealed in construction blasting and in the ballast used for the 
rail bed. This sparked  a prospecting rush. In time, with the development of processing 
technologies for extraction and for separation of nickel from copper, both extraction and 
smelting expanded. By 1902, the International Nickel company of Canada, INCO,  had been 
created from a merger of two earlier companies, and by 1918, INCO had become an integrated 
mining, smelting and refining firm, with a refinery in Port Colbourne (Saarinen). 
 Although Sudbury began as a Canadian Pacific Railways company town, the early 
development of mining then made it a significant mining community. During this period, the 
major mine enterprises operating in the area - INCO and Falconbridge - developed their own 
company towns at the mine-sites. Sudbury emerged as a type of fringe of settlement for the 
whole area. Its development was stunted, because most of the managerial and labour personnel 
from the mines lived in the company towns, while only those who were less integrated into the 
main mining economy settled in Sudbury. Moreover, the mine enterprises, unlike other industrial 
enterprises, did not pay local property taxes until after 1945. Even in 1945, the companies did 
not pay local taxes; instead, the Provincial Government provided a compensating revenue, 
though this amounted only to about one-half of the business revenues received in other non-
mining communities (Saarinen, 167.) This lack of an effective tax base limited community action 
for urban development, infrastructure, and beautification. In this era, Sudbury was famous for its 
the nickel industry, but also infamous for the environmental destruction caused by the sulphur 
emissions from the metal smelters, which killed much of the vegetation. The area bore an 
uncanny resemblance to the lunar landscape. 
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 After World War II Sudbury expanded  as nickel demand grew in response to military 
and consumer demands. The population in the area increased from about 115,000 in 1951 to 
around 170,000 in 1971. This population expansion, based ultimately on mineral exports from 
the region, was caused and, in turn, contributed to, a continuing process of economic 
diversification mainly of business, educational, health, and government services. Of particular 
note was the establishment of Laurentian University in 1960, which began to play an important 
role in the intellectual life and, in time, the technological leadership in the region. The Sudbury 
economy was further strengthened with the development of mining in Elliot Lake, which fell 
within Sudbury’s sphere of influence. The construction of a direct highway link with Southern 
Ontario via Parry Sound and Gravenhurst gave Sudbury a "gateway" location which allowed it to 
evolve as the major transportation centre of Northern Ontario, in competition with North Bay. 
Trans-Canada Airlines flights were introduced in 1952-54, further consolidating Sudbury’s 
status as a central transportation node.  
 During the 1970s, the Sudbury economy went into a process of contraction caused 
mainly by reduced mining employment as a result of lower mineral prices. Paradoxically,  the 
groundwork for a subsequent turnaround was also laid in this period. Competitive pressures on 
nickel production in the area led INCO and Falconbridge to rationalize their production and 
initiate major processes of technological improvement designed to lower production costs, 
improve productivity, and sustain international competitiveness. The upshot of this was that 
employment in mining in the Sudbury region declined from a high of 25,7000 in 1971, to 17,700 
in 1981 and to 9,146 in 1991. One result was population loss for the region, from 170,000 in 
1971 to 152,440 in 1986 (www.srdc.on.ca) 
 The positive feature of this era was that mining and mineral processing became steadily 
more technologically sophisticated and capital intensive. The Sudbury basin maintained its 
competitiveness in an ever-tougher international nickel market. The Sudbury area became a 
technological leader in high productivity and environmentally friendly technologies. 
 At the same time, the municipal government of the region was reorganized on January 1, 
1973, so that the whole of the Sudbury Basin became part of the Regional Municipality of 
Sudbury, an area of 2,600 square kilometres, or about four times the size of Toronto. This has 
meant that the effectiveness of regional planning for infrastructure and the promotion of 
economic development have improved. In 1974, a Sudbury Regional Development Corporation 
was established to promote economic development of the area. Further improvements in 
transportation, such as the highway to Timmins and Cochrane  also enhanced the “central-place” 
functions of the city. 
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 During the 1990s, the Sudbury area appears to have reversed the decline of the previous 
decade and to have consolidated its position as the major mining centre of the region. This 
strengthening of its position is the result of a variety of factors: 
1. INCO and Falconbridge have maintained and improved their competitive position in 
the Sudbury Basin. 
 
2.The commercial sphere of influence of Sudbury expanded due in part to improved 
transportation. Mine-related goods and services enterprises now have access to 
approximately 90 mines within a 300-mile radius. 
 
3. Effective civic leadership was important in improving the natural environment, 
beautifying the region, promoting economic development, supporting technological 
diversification, and promoting the location of regional health, educational, and 
governmental functions in the region. 
 
4. Support from government at the Provincial and Federal levels was also important as 
they relocated some of their administrative apparatuses to Sudbury: the Ministry of 
Northern Development and Mines (with 250 jobs) from Toronto, and the Sudbury 
Taxation Centre from Ottawa (with 750 full-time and 1500 part-time jobs). 
 
5. Strengthening of the roles of Laurentian University and Cambrian College in their 
support for research and training generally and specifically for the mineral economy. 
 
6.The dynamism of the newly emerging enterprises surrounding mining is a final factor 
of significance (www.sudbury-mining.ca) 
 
 B. Sudbury as a Mining Metropolis in the International Arena 
 By the year 2000, Sudbury had become an attractive and reasonably dynamic city. The 
Sudbury area has begun to establish itself as a centre for technological innovation in hard-rock 
mining with a consolidating range of minerals-oriented enterprises. The economy has become 
more dynamic with a series of other positive impulses.  The landscape is returning  to its natural 
state, and the city has become attractive in its healthy natural setting. Could Sudbury also 
participate more successfully in a hemispheric and global arena and beyond its regional base?. 
 One encouraging feature of the Sudbury economy at this time is the emphasis being 
placed on innovation. The roles of Laurentian University and Cambrian College in geological 
and mining areas are of special significance in the future promotion of a stronger mineral 
“cluster.” Laurentian University has offered full programs in Mining and Extractive 
Metallurgical Engineering since 1978, as well as general Civil, Mechanical and Chemical 
Engineering.  Laurentian also has a strong Earth Sciences Program. There are a number of 
research centres such as the Laurentian University Mining Automation Laboratory (LUMAL) 
and the Mineral Exploration Research Centre (MERC). LUMAL focusses on areas such as the 
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analysis and system architecture of tele-remote/automated mining systems, 3-D animation and 
simulation of mining operations and control systems for vehicle-based transport systems. MERC 
focuses on support for mineral exploration not only in the Sudbury region but also in Canada and 
the world. A $75 million Centre of Excellence in Mines and Mineral Research at Laurentian 
University is a multi-partner co-operative program with private and public participation. A 
commercial applied research park is being established by Laurentian University, in collaboration 
with the Government of Ontario and the Sudbury Regional Development Corporation 
(www.srdc.on.ca.) The offices of the Ontario Geological Survey and the Ontario Geo-science 
Laboratories have also been located at Laurentian University, and should provide support for the 
scientific infrastructure, which strengthens the mineral cluster in the Sudbury area. 
 Another important initiative is the establishment of NORCAT, the Northern Centre for 
Advanced Technology Inc. This Centre is a co-operative venture between Cambrian College of 
Applied Arts and Technology and private businesses. Its objective is to support enterprises with 
product development, technological transfer and training in resource industries generally, as well 
in as construction. In 1997, it acquired its own mine from Falconbridge for testing and training 
purposes. It has been involved in the development of  43 prototypes  in mining and construction, 
and has programs in ten countries. 
 A variety of enterprises relating to the primary mining activity has become established in 
the Sudbury area. These include enterprises in manufacturing, business services, geological and 
management consulting, export consulting and services, mine automation and communication, 
equipment maintenance and repair, machine shops, electrical, plumbing and ventilation 
contractors, and manufacturers of various sorts. By 1999, some 20 of these enterprises had joined 
CAMESE (1999/2000), the Canadian Association of Mining Equipment and Services for Export, 
indicating that they considered themselves ready for competition in a global market. 
 Since 1978, Sudbury has made a major effort to restore its environment. About 17,400 
hectares of land were barren and required re-vegetation and reforestation. A co-operative effort 
including the public sector, the private sector and the voluntary sector, restored some 3,200 
hectares by 1997, with about 3,500,000 trees planted in the area. There appeared to still be a long 
way to go. But the main residential areas of the region were again realms of natural beauty. This 
environmental restoration is important if Sudbury is to be an attractive place to live for the 
skilled personnel who constitute the basic human foundation for a thriving and self-sustaining 
urban centre. 
 By 2000, Sudbury also had established a diversified service economy providing for the 
population in its region. It had become a major educational centre for its region. It is a regional 
health centre with about 2,700 employed in the Sudbury hospital system. It is a thriving 
transportation and wholesaling hub for its region, with strong transport links to the national 
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economy. Finally, its manufacturing sector employed almost 5,000 persons in 1996. With this 
degree of economic diversification around the central economic activities related to mining, the 
economy of the Sudbury region should be self-sustaining to a significant degree, as long as the 
fundamental mining and transportation activities remain vibrant.  
 As with any region in a larger national or “globalized” economy, there are risks and 
vulnerabilities which will have to be faced in the future. One such challenge relates to the health 
and competitiveness of nickel mining and processing. If some of the new or expansion projects 
coming on stream elsewhere increase supplies well ahead of demand, thereby reducing price 
substantially, and if they are significantly lower-cost producers than those of the Sudbury Basin, 
there could be a contraction of nickel mining in the region. The dilemma for the Sudbury region 
is that for the mines to remain competitive, further reductions in the labour force may be 
required, as automation and remote-controlled mining techniques are extended. But it is also 
imperative that the mines themselves remain competitive in the global nickel economy.  
 A second challenge relates to the relationship of the region to INCO and Falconbridge, 
the two mining pillars of the regional economy. These companies are headquartered in Toronto, 
not Sudbury, and do not necessarily have any primordial loyalty to the Sudbury region simply 
because that was the initial source of their existence and expansion. 
 A third vulnerability of the region arises from the fact that open-pit mining is steadily 
increasing its relative role in the global mining economy, largely because it is  simpler and 
therefore lower-cost than underground mining which is technologically and logistically complex. 
The machinery and equipment producers of the Sudbury region specifically and Central Canada 
generally are geared to produce highly specialized products for underground hard-rock mining 
rather than the distinct machinery and equipment designed for open-pit mining. This means that 
the international market for the products of Central Canadian manufacturers on mining 
equipment may not be particularly expansive in the near future. 
 In sum, a transition from a successful mineral cluster for the regional mining economy to 
one which participates effectively in the international economy, may not be easy. One suggestion 
would be for the clusters centred in Sudbury, North Bay, and the Toronto areas to organize 
themselves as a “cluster of mineral clusters.” This would be useful in view of the very important 
range of mining related activities in the Toronto area including mine company headquarters, 
machinery and equipment producers, mine finance, geological, mining, and metallurgical 
consultants, and geophysical surveying. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion: Perspectives from Canadian Cases on Mine/Community Relations 
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 A variety of insights, perspectives and ideas from Canada’s experiences regarding the 
relationships of mining activities and local communities may be of interest for the mineral 
-rich countries of Latin America. The following is a summary of the general, socio-economic, 
and environmental impacts of mining activities on local communities from the foregoing 
Canadian cases. 
 
A. General Insights 
(i ) Mining can promote the socio-economic well-being of local communities and can 
also be environmentally benign. 
 
 Despite some cases of environmental damage of legendary magnitude as occurred in the 
first 50 or 60 years of nickel mining in the Sudbury basin, mining can be managed so as to be 
benign in environmental terms. Some disastrously serious environmental damages can also be 
reversed. The Sudbury case illustrates this. The Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan’s mine in 
Sussex New Brunswick is one which is astonishingly benign from an ecological perspective.  
 From a socio-economic standpoint, mining can also be particularly positive, and can 
contribute to local level community development and economic diversification. This was the 
case of Sussex, New Brunswick, and also of Sudbury, Ontario. 
 
(ii ) The Implications of “Remoteness” for Mine/Community Relations 
 The difficulties of the Diavik and Voisey’s Bay cases arise from their remoteness as well 
as issues of their relations with First Nations communities. The New Brunswick and Sudbury 
cases demonstrated positive and productive inter-relationships with the local communities. In 
part this is because the mines in these areas fitted in easily to the mainstream socio-economic 
systems, in the more populated, established, and diversified regions of the country. In contrast, 
the Diavik and Voisey’s Bay cases differ. Because of their magnitude and their technical, social, 
and economic novelty to the local communities, it will be more difficult for them to fit into the 
local societies without major disruption. This necessitates special public policy approaches, in 
order to ensure that the local communities benefit as much as possible. 
 
(iii) Long Distance Commuting” or “Fly-In / Fly-Out” mining may be the wave of 
the future for more remote mine sites everywhere. 
 
 There have been no new mining towns established in Canada since about 1970. Instead, 
mines fly or transport their workers to the mine site from nearby communities, often by air 
travel, for varying periods of time, such as four days on followed by three days off (4/3) or other 
arrangements depending often of the length of travel. Mining systems which avoid the 
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construction of dedicated mining towns and which transport the workers to the mine site from 
their homes in other communities have a number of major advantages for more remote locations. 
Because of these advantages, they will likely be used increasingly in future.  
 
B. Mining and the Local Environment 
 
(iv) Use an “Environmental Stewardship Fund or Foundation” Mechanism for those 
noxious mine and mill wastes which have to be stored in perpetuity. 
 
 The solid tailings or liquid wastes from mine or milling operations, which are noxious 
and which must be stored and neutralized for ever, should be financed by the mine enterprise, 
not by the local, regional, or national communities. This can be done by requiring that the 
company contribute some monies, over the life of the mine, into a “Fund” or “Foundation” 
designed to manage the wastes in perpetuity. The interest from the capital of the Fund would be 
used for the maintenance or stewardship of the tailings mountains, the solid tailings ponds, or 
liquid tailings ponds. If the mine operation turns out to be cleaner than expected, and the wastes 
less costly to manage than expected, some funds could be returned to the mine enterprise. This 
would serve as a powerful incentive for the enterprise to manage the wastes carefully over the 
life of the mine. 
 
 (v) The value of Comprehensive Environmental Reviews for new mine projects. 
 The comprehensive environmental reports prepared by the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency provide examples of the type of analysis of the probable impacts of mines 
on all aspects of the environment which could be useful in other national contexts.  
 The process involved in constructing the reports seems useul. The mine enterprise first 
prepares an analysis of the mine and of its environmental consequences,  together with a socio-
economic assessment. It does this on the basis of its technical, geological and organizational 
knowledge of the project, together with knowledge of the communities and the natural 
environment and public meetings. The local communities,  the regional governments, the 
Indigenous organizations, and other relevant Federal Ministries then make commentaries, 
criticisms, and  elaborations.  Interested NGOs have an opportunity to participate in the process 
as well. The mine enterprise then responds to these comments and criticisms. Finally, the 
Environmental Agency synthesizes, compatibilizes, and rationalizes the various analyses and 
perspectives, producing a summary and a detailed set of recommendations for modification of 
the project, if it is accepted. Or else, the Agency can halt a project.  
  
 (vi) Co-operative Monitoring of an Environmental Management Program.  
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 Monitoring of an environmental management program on a co-operative basis between 
the local communities, Indigenous organizations, and the mine enterprise is desirable in order to 
ensure that the program is implemented carefully and completely. 
 
C. Socio-Economic Benefits 
 
(vii) “Socio-Economic Agreements” between Mine Enterprises and Local 
Communities or Indigenous Organizations  
 
 Prior to the receipt of permission to open a mine, the enterprise and the relevant local 
communities and/or Indigenous Organizations should be required to construct a mutually 
acceptable “Socio-Economic Agreement” or an “Impact and Benefit Agreement.” Such an 
agreement could include provisions for: 
-Employment quotas or targets; 
- Special training programs appropriate for local people;  
- Targets for local procurement of goods and services; 
- Support for local business development; 
- Support for women’s employment and training as appropriate; 
- A supportive work environment for distinctive local cultures; 
 
 Because of asymmetric knowledge between the mine enterprises and the Indigenous  
Organizations or local communities, particular types of support must be provided to the latter, in 
order to “ level the playing field.” This could be done by the public financing of NGOs or 
consultants services, or perhaps with public officials from other levels of government, who 
would provide some of the relevant technical, geological, marketing and organizational 
knowledge as well as techniques of negotiation. 
 
(viii) Promotion of Genuine Participation of Indigenous Peoples in Mineral 
Development 
 
 Increasing numbers of mine projects are located in areas occupied by Indigenous Peoples 
in both Latin America and Canada. In many cases, these peoples have occupied the relevant 
lands since time immemorial and are the true owners of the mineral resources. Mineral projects 
can succeed in winning the support of local communities of Indigenous  Peoples and in 
producing real benefits for their human development if they are genuinely integrated into the 
process of design, implementation and functioning. This means that the original project 
proposals must fully incorporate the particular environmental concerns and knowledge of the 
Aboriginal peoples as well as their economic activities in the affected areas into the planning 
process.  
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 (ix) Development of the Clusters of Economic Activities around Mining 
 For mineral-rich countries, development of the “mineral cluster,” or of those activities 
related to mining is an important means of developing some degree of economic diversification, 
and of capturing increased value added within the national economy. The case of Sudbury 
Ontario is a case of partial but incomplete development of the mineral “cluster.” 
 Promotion of such diversification around mining is difficult. However, some relevant 
public policies would be  
- To promote the “culture” and elaboration of the cluster by supporting the relevant 
professional organizations, publications, and communications; 
- To encourage procurement within the country, and export of goods and services from 
the “cluster” abroad. 
- To promote the development of specialized human resources in the cluster through 
education at all levels; 
  - To support the provision of “public goods” for the cluster, including the development of 
relevant knowledge, physical and institutional infrastructure; and geological mapping; 
- To construct a fair inter-sectoral tax system, which neither provides implicit subsidies 
or heavy “cash cow” treatment of mining. 
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